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Military Medical Malpractice: Remedies
For the Overseas Dependent
Elizabeth Grigalauskas is the daughter of an enlisted man in the
United States Army. She was born in a United States military hos-
pital, and shortly after her birth she was negligently injected with
undiluted medication by the attending Army doctor. Elizabeth and
her parents sued for damages for her permanent disabilities. The
court held that they had a cause of action against the government and
a substantial verdict was awarded.'
Marcelle Rafftery also brought suit against the United States
alleging medical malpractice by American military doctors in an
American military hospital. In this case, the court held that no valid
cause of action existed and sustained a motion to dismiss.2
Why was Elizabeth allowed a judicial remedy while Marcelle
was not? Both Elizabeth and Marcelle were American citizens, and
both were treated by American doctors in United States military hos-
pitals. The former had a cause of action; the latter did not. The
answer lies in the limited remedy provided military dependents who
are victims of medical malpractice committed by military doctors
abroad. Elizabeth was in the United States when her case arose; 3
Marcelle was in Germany.4 This Note attempts to investigate this
congressionally induced discrepancy in the legal remedies available
to military dependents.
The Department of Defense and the armed forces of the United
States maintain a worldwide system of hospitals and clinics5 to serve
the medical needs of service personnel and their dependents at home
1. Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd on
other grounds, 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952).
2. Rafftery v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1957) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671 & 2680 (excluding tort actions against the United States for any claim arising
in a foreign country) and United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949) (defining
"foreign country" as any area over which the United States does not have sovereignty)).
3. 103 F. Supp. at 545.
4. 150 F. Supp. at 618.
5. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3067-3070 (1970) (Army Medical Service); 10 U.S.C. §§ 5131,
5137-5140 (1970) (Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery); 10 U.S.C. §§ 8067(a)-
8067(f), 8207 (1970) (Air Force). The Marine Corps functions within the Depart-
ment of the Navy. 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (1970). It maintains no separate medical unit.
Marine personnel are included in the primary mission of the Naval Medical Service.
32 C.F.R. § 728.1 (1976).
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and abroad. Over 10.5 million Americans receive care under this
health system.7  The recent rapid rise in civilian medical malpractice
claims has been accompanied by a concurrent growth in similar claims
against the United States and the medical personnel who practice in
armed services facilities.' Because of the dissimilarity in the statutory
bases used for these claims' and the complexity of the administrative
procedure, there exists a distinct dichotomy in the recovery available
to dependent patients injured stateside and to those injured abroad.
The best source for a monetary recovery lies with the federal
government as the employer of the military doctor. The strong finan-
cial base of the government, as contrasted with that of the doctor,
ensures satisfaction of any judgment awarded. Because our national
government has historically been cloaked with sovereign immunity,10
a statutory waiver must exist which grants a cause of action before
a tort suit is possible. The principal legal means of reaching the
sovereign is not available to military dependents whose injuries occur
outside the United States. The Federal Tort Claims Act" affords
relief for the dependent victims of medical malpractice in cases in
which the situs of the tort is within the United States. By statutory
wording victims elsewhere are excluded from recovery under the Act.12
6. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 728-728.94 (1976) (medical care for eligible persons at
Naval medical facilities); 32 C.F.R. § 577.1-577.84 (1976) (Army medical and dental
care); 32 C.F.R. §§ 815.1-815.100 (1976) (persons eligible for medical care by the
Air Force).
7. Welch & Shear, Malpractice Claims in the Federal Sector, in HEW, REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMsISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 26, 27 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Welch & Shear].
8. See note 162 & accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 23-25 & accompanying text infra.
10. "No maxim is thought to be better established, or more universally assented
to, than that which ordains that a sovereign . . . cannot ex delicto be amenable to its
own creatures or agents employed under its own authority for the fulfilment merely
of its own legitimate ends. A departure from this maxim can be sustained only upon
the ground of permission on the part of the sovereign .... .. Hill v. United States,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850). See generally Kramer, The Governmental Tort
Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, U. ILL. L.F. 795 (1966); Note,
Sovereign Immunity - An Anathema to the "Constitutional Tort," 12 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 543, 547-50 (1972); Note, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limit-
ing Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 940-41
(1976).
11. This Act is distributed in the Judiciary Code at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b),
1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412, 2671-2680 (1970).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970). "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346
(b) of this title shall not apply to
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country." Id.
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Another potential means of reaching the sovereign is denied these
claimants. Under the Foreign Claims Act,13 persons abroad who are
victims of torts committed by members or employees of the United
States government ordinarily receive damage and injury compensation.
This law, with its avowed congressional purpose of fostering and en-
hancing international relations, allows for the prompt settlement of
claims presented by foreign nationals or their governments. By defini-
tion, military dependents who are inhabitants of the United States and
who are abroad in response to military orders are not permitted to
recover under the Foreign Claims Act.14
The overseas military dependent seeking relief from the govern-
ment may find statutory aid in the Military Claims Act.'3 This law
provides a purely administrative procedure that is discretionary in
nature and that has no provision for judicial review.' 6 Under the
Act, the military evaluates the merits of the claim filed against it and
decides whether to award damages and if so, in what amount.' 7
Beyond appeal to the same branch of the military which made the
original denial or reduction of the claim, 18 no statutory recourse exists.
Failing to recover from the government, the injured dependent
will look to the other possible defendant, the doctor. In October 1976,
however, Title 10 of the United States Code was amended to make
the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy in those cases cog-
nizable thereunder for medical malpractice in the military.19 The
statutory change prevents suits against the individual tortfeasor for
negligence 20 and automatically transmutes the action into one against
the federal government under the provisions of Title 28.21 The amend-
ment also grants discretionary powers to the Secretary of Defense to
hold harmless military personnel subjected to suit for medical mal-
13. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970).
14. See notes 97-98 & accompanying text infra.
15. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1970).
16. See notes 108-11 & accompanying text infra.
17. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1970). "Under such regulations as the Secretary con-
cerned may prescribe, he, or .. .the Judge Advocate General of an armed force under
his jurisdiction . . .may settle, and pay . . .a claim against the United States for
(3) personal injury or death; either caused by a civilian officer or employee of that
department... or a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, [or] Marine Corps ...."
Id.
18. Id. (a).
19. Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (to be codified in
10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1976)).
20. Id. (a).
21. Id. (c).
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practice if the action is not under the purview of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
22
The military dependent seeking damages for malpractice operates
within this basic legal scheme. The stateside dependent can sue the
government but not the individual doctor. The overseas dependent
may not sue the government but may file a claim for an administrative
settlement. Whether the overseas dependent may sue the individual
doctor is uncertain.
This Note will consider the recovery problems presented to the
overseas military dependent by examining the legislative and judicial
development of the law and by evaluating the adequacy of the present
system of remedies. Finally, the Note will make recommendations
for legislative reconsideration of this particular aspect of federal tort
law.
Legislative and Judicial History
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 23 the Foreign Claims Act,24 and
the Military Claims Act 25 were passed, and later amended, to meet
specific needs as Congress perceived them. As discussed below, this
evolving development has resulted in a tort recovery system with areas
of overlap, areas of no coverage, and areas in which a law is used for
a purpose never anticipated by Congress because no other remedy
exists. Although each of these three statutory schemes is an important
method for military tort recovery, only the Military Claims Act offers
a remedy for the overseas dependent.
The Federal Tort Claims Act
The most comprehensive waiver of sovereign immunity is the
Federal Tort Claims Act.26 There seems little doubt that for many
years Congress recognized the need for the government to accept
responsibility for certain of its actions that resulted in damage to its
residents. Delay was caused in resolving how best to provide for
the payment of these claims. Early attempts came via the Court of
Claims, which was established in 185527 as a fact finding body to aid
Congress but which was not a decisionmaking body in its own right.
Congress still made the final determination in each case. As the work-
22. Id. (f).
23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b).
2412, 2671-2680 (1970).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1970).
26. See notes 11-12 & accompanying text supra.
27. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
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load increased, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was gradually
expanded 28 until, under the Tucker Act of 1887,29 it could both hear
and determine claims arising under the Constitution, the laws of Con-
gress, and any executive order or contract. Cases sounding in tort
were expressly excluded, however.30  Each tort claim continued to
be heard by Congress in the form of a private relief bill which received
individual consideration. This procedure was patently unsatisfactory,
and the members of Congress faced increasing pressure for reform.
The first reform bill was introduced into the House in 1919.31 For
the next twenty-seven years the legislature debated a succession of
bills concerning the issue of tort liability and finally resolved the matter
with passage of Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.32
Officially referred to as the Federal Tort Claims Act, this remark-
able legislation put the federal government in approximately the posi-
tion of a private citizen for certain specific purposes. By the Act's
terms, it makes the United States liable in an action in tort for money
damages on account of property loss or damage, personal injury, or
death, caused by the negligent or wrongful action of a government
employee acting within the scope of employment "if a private person,
would be liable [in respect to such claims] to the [same] claimants."33
Suits under this Act are filed in United States district courts,3 4 and the
law of the situs of the tort is applied.
3 5
While granting this broad waiver of immunity, Congress specifi-
cally excluded certain tort actions from coverage. 36 Two of these
exclusions directly affect the military dependent. These exclusions
are: (1) any claim based upon the exercise or failure to exercise
a discretionary function or duty,3 7 and (2) any claim arising in a
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. This Act conferred jurisdiction
on the Court of Claims to render judgments on petitions and bills for private claims
against the government and to consider setoffs and counterclaims. Id.
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
30. "All claims founded upon the Constitution .. . or any law of Congress .. .
or upon any regulation of an Executive Department, or upon any contract .. .with
the Covernment of the United States .. . in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of
which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States ... if
the United States were suable ...... Id. § 1.
31. H.R. 14737, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919).
32. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.; see note 11 supra).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
34. Id.
35. Id. The United States, however, reserves liability under local law for interest
prior to judgment and for punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
37. Id. (a).
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foreign country.38 Both of these provisions have resulted in case
law defining the limits under which actions for medical malpractice
injuries to dependents will be cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
The Federal Tort Claims Act has been amended several times since
194639 but the basic recovery rights have remained constant. The
changes have generally been inconsequential procedural matters, ex-
cept for the 1966 amendment in which the settlement requirements
of the law were substantially increased.
40
As originally passed ,each head of a federal agency had the power
to "consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any claim against
the United States . . . where the total amount of the claim [did] not
exceed $1,000."41 This remedy, available to the claimant on a volun-
tary basis, offered an alternative to court action.42  Under the law as
it presently reads, however, each potential plaintiff must present a
claim for a sum certain to the agency accountable for the damage.
43
The agency has six months in which to attempt to reach a settlement
or to pay the claim in full before court action may be initiated.44
There is no limit on the amount that may be awarded by the depart-
ment; however, damages paid in excess of $25,000 require the signed
advance approval of the Attorney General. 45  Any administrative set-
tlement accepted by the claimant is final and bars further recovery. 46
In the event no administrative accord is reached, a trial on the
merits of the case may be held in district court.47  In the trial, without
a jury,48 the plaintiff has available the full range of discovery, evidence,
38. Id. (k).
39. Act of Aug. 1, 1947, ch. 446, 61 Stat. 722; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 929, 933, 937, 942, 964, 971, 973, 982-994; Act of Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92,
§§ 1-2, 63 Stat. 62; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §§ 80(b), 109, 124-126, 63 Stat.
101, 105-107; Act of July 16, 1949, ch. 340, 63 Stat. 444; Act of Sept. 23, 1950,
ch. 1010 § 9, 64 Stat. 987; Act of Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, §§ 2(a)(2), 13(5), 64
Stat. 1038, 1043; Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, § 12(e), 72 Stat. 348; Act
of Aug. 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-168, tit. II, § 202(b), 73 Stat. 389; Act of Sept. 8,
1959, Pub. L. 86-238, § 1(1), (3), 73 Stat. 471, 472; Act of Sept. 21, 1961, Pub.
L. 87-258, § 1, 75 Stat. 539; Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. 89-506, §§ 1-5(a), 8, 9,
80 Stat. 306-308.
40. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306.
41. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, cl. 753, § 403(a), 60 Stat. 842, § 403(a).
42. The claim procedure, as an alternative remedy, was incompatible with court
action. A prerequisite for instituting suit was the official withdrawal by giving fifteen
days written notice of any administrative claim made. Id. at 60 Stat. 844, § 410(b).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1970).
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1970).
46. Id.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970).
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cross-examination, and argument permissible in any other suit arising
in tort. The judgment of the district court is reviewable in the federal
appellate system.
49
By combining the required attempts at settlement outside the
court system with the availability of judicial remedies, Congress has
reached a balance between expeditious, cost saving procedures and
the more protracted, costly trial system. Both parties are aware that
if good faith negotiation does not succeed and there is no agreement
as to the amount of damages due, an impartial trial is available.
Congress further recognized the urgent need of injured persons
to be competently advised as to their legal rights and to be adequately
represented in their dealings with the government. To implement
this avowed public policy, in the original Federal Tort Claims Act
Congress made attorney's fees recoverable within the judgment or
award.50 At present, an attorney is entitled to fees equal to twenty
percent of any settlement figure and twenty-five percent of any court
judgment.5'
Several factors lead to the conclusion that the Federal Tort Claims
Act is the congressionally preferred method of dealing with those
claims arising out of federal medical malpractice. First, the statute
states that the federal government will be liable if a private individual
would be liable in like circumstances.5 2  This language indicates a
congressional intent to incorporate into the bill the general type of
tort litigation prevalent at enactment.58 Medical malpractice cases
had been appearing in the courts for a number of years, and they had
become a part of the general body of tort law.54 If Congress did
not intend to include litigation of this type, it could have expressly
excluded it. No such exclusion was made.
Second, the Federal Tort Claims Act has continued to be utilized
for malpractice actions without congressional intervention. Since its
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
50. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 422, 60 Stat. 842.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970).
52. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 842. The present law has
identical wording. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
53. The Supreme Court in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950)
took note of the language used by Congress in the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
Court found the law did not create new causes of action but rather accepted liability
under circumstances in which private liability would exist. A historical study of pri-
vate tort liability is properly usable to determine congressional intent to include or
exclude a certain type of liability from the Act.
54. Weintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1938); Carr v. Shiffiette, 82 F.2d
874 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1945);
Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); McBride v. Saylin, 6 Cal. 2d 134,
56 P.2d 941 (1936); Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal. App. 2d 486, 123 P.2d 544 (1942);
Adams v. Boyce, 37 Cal. App. 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 694 (1940).
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passage, the Federal Tort Claims Act has been repeatedly used to seek
damages from federal health care providers, especially the Veterans'
Administration.5" Yet the law was codified without substantive change
in the recovery rights of claimants. Through repeated amendments,
the Federal Tort Claims Act has remained a viable force in malpractice
recoveries.
The most conclusive showing of intent is congressional legislation
making the Federal Tort Claims Act the sole remedy in certain mal-
practice actions. Doctors and other health care personnel in the Vet-
erans' Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of
Defense (including the Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Central In-
telligence Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration56 are protected from civil suit if the case is one that is cognizable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In debating these changes, Con-
gress was squarely presented with the issue of medical malpractice in
the federal domain, and it found that the Federal Tort Claims Act
offered a sound means of determining liability, assessing damages, and
resolving conflicts and that it was this type of action that was within
the intended purview of the Act.5 7
Shortly after the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, a body
of case law began to develop defining the range and scope of its appli-
cability. Although the legislative intent was to provide for extensive
tort coverage, court decisions under the Act soon made it clear that
the results intended would not be uniformly available within the
military community. The use of the Act by service personnel and
their dependents was severely limited.
The first significant decisions under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for the armed forced were Feres v. United States58 and the companion
55. Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Toal v. United
States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); Ashley v. United States, 413 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1969); Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962); Quinton v. United
States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962); Hulver v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 749
(W.D. Mo. 1975); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd 343 F.2d 222 (1964).
56. 38 U.S.C. § 4116 (1970) (Veterans' Administration); 42 U.S.C. § 233 (1970)
(Public Health Service); Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (De-
partment of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration).
57. To Provide for an Exclusive Remedy Against the United States in Suits Based
Upon Medical Malpractice on the Part of Active Duty Military Medical Personnel, and
for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 3954 Before the House Comm. on Armed Services,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1975) (testimony of Charles Kruse) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
58. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The executrix of the estate of Feres brought suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for the death of Feres, an Army officer, in a barracks fire
allegedly caused by the negligence of his senior military officers. The United States
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cases, Griggs v. United States59 and Jefferson v. United States.60
These actions for wrongful death and personal injury were brought
on behalf of members of the armed forces who were injured on mili-
tary bases or in military hospitals. Although the parties were not
actually performing military duties at the time of the torts, they were
officially on active service.61 Primarily because there was neither a
history of liability within the military nor a comparable civilian lia-
bility,62 the Supreme Court held that damages for injury and death
to a member of the armed forces are not recoverable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act if the injuries "arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service."63
Although Feres settled that members of the armed forces on
active duty cannot sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act for military
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit based on the
failure of Congress expressly to provide for recovery by soldiers. 177 F.2d 535 (2d
Cir. 1949).
59. 178 F.2d 1 (1oth Cir. 1949). The executrix of the estate of Griggs brought
an action based on negligent medical practice resulting in the death of Griggs at an
Army hospital in Illinois. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said the stat-
utory exclusion from coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act for combatant ac-
tivities of the military (28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)) did not apply, and it could find no
other statutory exclusion applicable to the claim. It reasoned that Congress deliber-
ately did not exclude the government-soldier relationship and thus allowed the claim.
Id.
60. 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949). Jefferson sued the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for damages caused by alleged negligent abdominal surgery
performed at an Army hospital in Virginia while Jefferson was a member of the armed
forces. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a judgment for the de-
fendant based on recognition of the unique relationship between the armed forces
personnel and their superior military authorities in which the federal courts should not
interfere, the lack of express congressional intent to apply state law on federal military
reservations, and other statutory means of recovery for military personnel. Id.
61. Feres, Griggs and Jefferson were consolidated on certiorari. "The common
fact underlying the three cases is that each claimant, while on active duty and not
on furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340
U.S. at 138.
62. The Court said the Federal Tort Claims Act must be construed in light of
the total congressional statutory scheme. No American law had ever permitted a
soldier to recover from a fellow military member on a theory of negligence. The Court
did not find parallel activity for private citizens to meet the like circumstances test.
Further, if actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act were allowed, it would subject
the government-armed forces relationship to state law. It further held that other
federal statutes provided compensation. Id. at 139-45. "We do not think that Cong-
ress, in drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence. We cannot impute to Congress
such a radical departure from established law in the absence of express congressional
command." Id. at 146.
63. Id.
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medical malpractice, the question remained whether military depen-
dents who were injured by virtue of being on a military installation in-
cident to their sponsor's military service were excluded from recovery
under the doctrine expressed in Feres. The answer has been a firm
"no."
In Herring v. United States, 64 for example, a dependent wife was
injured through the negligence of the employees of a federal hospital
where she had been admitted for care. The government pleaded that
no liability could attach to the United States because the injuries were
incident to military service. In rejecting this argument, the court
said, "The determining factor appears to be the status of the injured
party."65  The plaintiff's injuries incurred as a dependent wife were
not incident to service on her part, and a cause of action existed for her.
The district court in Messer v. United States66 was faced with a
similar problem. A dependent wife of a active duty serviceman was
negligently given a spinal anesthetic in an Army hospital. The court,
extending Herring, held that she was not barred from recovering
damages for her injuries, nor was her husband barred from suing the
government for her damages. The fact that he could not have re-
covered for his own injuries as in Feres did not preclude his seeking
damages for injury to his dependent. 67  Since 1951 there has been no
serious challenge to the principle that the status of the injured party,
not the spouse, determines whether Feres will bar suit. The Federal
Tort Claims Act has consistently been used as a means for securing
recoveries for dependent victims of medical malpractice. 6
Further challenges to dependent recoveries under the Federal
Tort Claims Act were based on the first exception to its coverage. The
title does not cover "any claim . . .based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused . . ... 69 In
64. 98 F. Supp. 69 (D. Colo. 1951).
65. Id. at 70.
66. 95 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
67. Id. at 513. Edgar Messer sought to recover medical expenses and damages
for the loss of assistance and companionship of his wife. The court held that the
injuries suffered were not "incident to his service" and the statutory recovery rights
of 38 U.S.C.A. § 701 underlying the Feres decision did not apply. Id.
68. Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975); Portis v. United States,
483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952); Grigalauskas v. United States,
103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). This specialized use of the term "discretion-
ary function" within an administrative setting is not to be confused with its meaning
when used as a defense in medical malpractice actions to denote the exercise of medical
judgment and opinion.
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Denny v. United States7" a dependent wife was negligently denied
medical treatment by the military base where the husband was sta-
tioned. Recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act was denied.
The court, relying on statutory construction, decided that a dependent
is entitled to care in military health facilities only if the medical officer
in charge determines there is space available.7 1 The primary mission
of the medical corps is to serve personnel on active duty, and sufficient
bed space must remain available to meet any military need. The
medical officer may exercise absolute discretion and may refuse care
to dependents; the officer's decision is conclusive.72
Shortly thereafter, the limits of the Denny ruling were tested in
Costley v. United States.73 Mrs. Costley, an Army dependent wife,
pleaded that she had been negligently given a spinal anesthetic at an
Army hospital in Texas. The government contended that Denny ap-
plied and that by treating her the military was exercising a discre-
tionary function. The court recognized the discretionary nature of
dependent health care but held that the Army exercised its peroga-
tive by admitting her to the hospital. Once admitted, the discretion
ceased, and Mrs. Costley as a patient was entitled to be treated with
"due and reasonable care, skill, diligence and ability."74
Costley thus affirms the proposition that dependents have no legal
right to be admitted to military hospitals or treated in outpatient
clinics. Once treatment has begun, however, Costley dictates that
medical personnel must observe the standard of care applicable under
local law. If this standard is not met and a tort ensues, the military
dependent in the United States has a cause of action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.
The most significant limitation on the use of the Federal Tort
Claims Act by dependents results from another exclusion within the
Act. The provisions exclude "any claim arising in a foreign country."7 5
In 1949, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Spelar76 a wrong-
ful death action brought by the administratrix of the estate of a flight
engineer who was killed at a United States airbase in Newfoundland.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that the language
in the Federal Tort Claims Act excluding "any claim arising in a for-
70. 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
71. Id. at 366.
72. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 728.2(a), (b), (c) (1976) (Navy); 32 C.F.R. § 815.3
(a) (1976) (Air Force); 32 C.F.R. § 577.2(b)(2)(i) (1976) (Army).
73. 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
74. Id. at 725.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1970).
76. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
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eign country" did not apply to a United States military base held under
a long term lease.7 7  The Supreme Court reversed. It said:
Sufficient basis for our conclusion lies in the express words of the
statute. We know of no more accurate phrase in common English
usage than "foreign country" to denote territory subject to the sov-
ereignty of another nation. By the exclusion of claims "arising
in a foreign country," the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act was geared to the sovereignty of the United States.78
The Court stressed that the transfer of the property used by the air-
base did not include a transfer of sovereignty over the leased areas.
The base remained subject to the sovereignty of Great Britain, and
therefore, the claim arose in a foreign country within the meaning of
the Act.
79
In Spelar the Court considered in detail the legislative history of
the Federal Tort Claims Act in an attempt to determine legislative
intent. The Court expressly noted that an earlier version of the bill,
which defined scope in terms of citizenship of the claimant, had been
rejected in favor of limiting the Act in terms of national sovereignty. 0
Because liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act was to be de-
termined by the law of the situs, Congress expressed apprehension
that foreign law would become involved in cases in which the tort
occurred outside the United States. The lawmakers were anxious to
avoid this unneccessary complexity and decided to keep such claims
under the control of the Committee on Claims."' The Court held
that this "legislati-'e will must be respected."82
Because of the wording of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
judicial decision in Spelar, the overseas military dependent is excluded
from using the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of securing a re-
covery for medical malpractice. This result is certain despite the fact
the tort is committed in an American hospital by an American doctor
on an American patient.
77. 171 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948). Relying on Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377 (1948), in which the Fair Labor Standards Act was held applicable to
a military base in Burmuda as a "possession" of the United States, the court held
the Federal Tort Claims Act would also apply to United States military bases abroad
as possessions. Id. at 209.
78. 338 U.S. at 219 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. The Court reaffirmed Vermilya-Brown but said the United States never
acquired sovereignty over the property of a military base. Such bases are merely
possessions and as such do not come within the statutory definition for the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id. at 221-22.
80. Id. at 220.
81. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1942).
82. 338 U.S. at 221.
[Vol. 29
MILITARY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In discussing military medical malpractice during a subcommittee
hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Brigadier General
Walter Reed, Assistant Judge Advocate General for the Air Force,
specifically addressed the matter: "[T]here are a number of situations
in which suit against the United States is not possible. For example,
the United States cannot be sued under the so-called Federal Tort
Claims Act .. . for claims arising in a foreign country, though other
statutes allow the payment of claims - but not suits - in those cases."83
This Note now turns to consideration of these "other statutes" that
allow for the payment of claims for torts occurring overseas.
The Foreign Claims Act
More than thirty years before Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the United States government recognized the need to
accept financial responsibility for certain military activities that in-
herently contained a high risk factor for American and foreign civilian
populations. Congress met the obligation with a twofold concept of
administrative claim procedures. The first bill8 4 in 1912 was the
precursor of the present Military Claims Act, and the second 5 in
1918 was to set the pattern for the Foreign Claims Act. Both acts
have continued to share much in their development, yet, they are
distinct in purpose, underlying philosophy, and application.
The Foreign Claims Act is directed toward the achievement of
prompt, expeditious settlement of all claims made under its provisions.
Its avowed purpose is to foster friendly foreign relations on a world-
wide basis, thereby becoming a part of our international political arm.
Considerations beyond the claim itself may thus encourage a speedy
resolution and a fair settlement.
Administrative payment for damages caused by the United States
military was initially instituted at the conclusion of World War I when
Congress approved payment for damage caused by our military forces
in nonenemy nations.86  After the beginning of World War II, the
Department of Defense urgently needed greatly expanded power to
meet the accelerated pace of claims that accompanied our massive war
effort. The result was passage of the Foreign Claims Act8 7 in a form
83. Hearings on H.R. 3954 Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Malpractice Hearings].
84. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 391, 37 Stat. 569, 586 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2733 (1970)).
85. Act of April 18, 1918, ch. 57, 40 Stat. 532 (repealed 1943) (current version
at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970)).
86. Id.
87. Act of Jan. 2, 1942, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (repealed 1956, 1958) (cur-
rent version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970)).
January 1978]
that has survived substantially unchanged until the present. ss To
accomplish the Act's "purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly
relations by the prompt settlement of meritorious claims," Congress
authorized the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to
appoint a commission that would "consider, adjust, determine, and
make payments in final settlement of bona fide claims" up to $1,00089
in amount. The scope of the Act extended to damages occurring in
a foreign country that were caused by the Army, Navy, or Marine
Corps forces or individual members of each service.
The current law reads much the same. "To promote and maintain
friendly relations through the prompt settlement of meritorious claims
arising in foreign countries, the Secretary of a military department
.. .may . .. appoint one or more claims commissions .. . to set-
tle and pay any claim."90  The jurisdictional amount has been in-
creased from the original $1,000 to $25,00091 to offset the effects of
world-wide inflation and increasingly to relieve the Congressional
Claims Commission of the burden of dealing with small amounts.
Congress also authorized settlement of claims in excess of the juris-
dictional limit by allowing the department concerned to pay up to
$25,000 and to submit to Congress a request for payment of the
remainder. 
2
As originally passed, the law allowed payment to those victims
who were inhabitants93 of the country where the damage or injury
88. This Act was codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970) without substantive changes.
89. Act of Jan. 2, 1942, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (repealed 1956, 1958) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970)).
90. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a), (d) (Supp. V, 1975).
92. Id. § 2734(d). The settlement power to pay partial claims was considered
an important factor in limiting resentment among foreign nationals and easing in-
ternational problems in the wake of military accidents. H.R. REP. No. 91-211, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). The procedure for the congressional remitting process is
identical to that of the corresponding section of the Military Claims Act. See note
190 & accompanying text infra.
93. In matters of international law and jurisdiction, "inhabitant" has been defined
as being synonymous with "citizen" or "subject." The three terms are based on the
concept of "allegiance" to the nation state by the individual. The Pizarro, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 227 (1817). Accord, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892)
(citizen and inhabitant equal in meaning for purposes of jurisdiction); Linton v.
Cantrell, 34 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) (citizen as used in the Judicial Code
synonymous with inhabitant); People v. Guariglia, 187 Misc. 843, 65 N.Y.S.2d 96
(1946) (active duty serviceman in Europe inhabitant of New York for the running
of the statute of limitations); In re Blanchard's Estate, 176 Misc. 796, 29 N.Y.S.2d
359 (1941) (domicile abroad not incompatible with United States citizenship). These
terms have been defined by various jurisdictions. E.g., People v. Renda, 313 N.Y.S.2d
816, 819 (1970) (domicile is the true fixed permanent home and the place to which
a person whenever absent intends to return); Ozbolt v. Lumbermen's Indemnity Ex-
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occurred. 4 After passage of the law Congress realized that these
recovery terms were not complete. Private relief bills were necessary
to provide compensation in those cases in which the residence of the
inhabitant and the tort situs were in different foreign countries.95 The
legislators then amended the law so that inhabitants of any foreign
country could recover damages.90 As envisioned in 1946, the Federal
Tort Claims Act would cover those torts occurring in the United States,
and the Foreign Claims Act would be used for the remaining areas of
the world.
The military dependent who is injured by medical malpractice
overseas is not provided tort recovery under either of these two acts.
The Federal Tort Claims Act relies on the location of the tort, the
United States, to define its statutory coverage, while the Foreign Claims
Act defined its scope in terms of "inhabitants," thus excluding those
citizens who owe their allegiance to the United States but reside else-
where. Both the Code of Federal Regulations9W and the regulations
of each of the military services9" state that military dependents who
are overseas by virtue of a sponsor's duty assignment are excluded
claimants for purposes of the Foreign Claims Act. Dependents are
thus explicitly denied recovery for their claims under this Act.
When Congress considered the twofold statutory scheme of the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act, it apparently
did not anticipate the post-World War II need to maintain large num-
bers of dependents abroad, nor the increase in malpractice actions
arising from the treatment of military dependents in military hospitals.
These two factors have created a problem not envisioned by Congress.
The overseas dependent has been left without an adequate legal
remedy.
The Military Claims Act
Military activities by their very nature involve risk of harm that
is not necessarily the result of fault or wrongdoing. Other injuries
occur for which the victim should, in the interest of fairness and good
change, 204 S.W. 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (citizenship which is status of member
of the body politic of a sovereign state not equivalent of residence).
94. Act of Jan. 2, 1942, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (repealed 1956, 1958)
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970)).
95. H.R. REP. No. 289, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
96. Act of July 28, 1956, ch. 769, 70 Stat. 703 (1956) (repealed 1956, 1958)
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1970)).
97. See 32 C.F.R. § 842.51 (1976) (Air Force); 32 C.F.R. § 753.10(a) (1976)
(Navy); 32 C.F.R. § 536.26(h)(2)(ii) (1976) (Army).
98. See U.S. DE'T OF ARmy, Rsx. No. 27-20, para. 10-8(b) (2) (1970 & Supp.
1977); U.S. DEP'T OF Am FOnCE MANUALREG. No. 112-1, § 8-1 (Oct. 14, 1977);
U.S. DEP'T OF NAVy, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEERA, § 2210 (1970).
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will, be given recompense, although the injuries are not the result of
torts in classic legal terms. In 1912 Congress recognized the need and
authorized the military to settle small claims of this type without a
finding that the government was negligent as a prerequisite to re-
coveryY9  The fact of injury was sufficient. In 1922 a new basis for
recovery was added; claims for damages up to $1,000 to private prop-
erty caused by the negligence of any officer or employee of the gov-
ernment acting within the scope of employment could be settled by
the head of each government agency.100 This latter development was
based on fault and was somewhat like the later Federal Tort Claims
Act, but no legal claim for relief was created. The law remained
administrative in nature.
After passage of a number of limited and restrictive recovery
bills,10' in 1943 Congress attempted to combine these measures into
a cohesive whole and passed the Military Claims Act.10 2  This legis-
lation authorized the Secretary of War and the Secretary's designees
to pay claims for damage to or loss of property or for personal injury
or death caused by military personnel or civilian employees of the
War Department or of the Army while acting within the scope of their
employment or otherwise incident to noncombat activities. 0 3  This
Act maintained a twofold basis for recovery: first, recovery for acts
of military personnel that were "incident to noncombat activities" and
second, for acts of military personnel within the "scope of their em-
ployment." Any settlement thereunder was final.10 4
The 1943 law remains the basic form of the law today. In 1945
the Military Claims Act was expanded to cover the Navy, 105 and in
1956 it was incorporated into the United States Code in Title 10,106
99. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 391, 37 Stat. 569, 586 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§2733 (1970)).
100. Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066 (repealed 1946).
101. Act of July 2, 1942, ch. 477, 56 Stat. 611, 620 (repealed 1946) (military air-
craft damage); Act of July 2, 1942, ch. 477, 56 Stat. 611, 615 (repealed 1945) (private
property damages under War Department); Act of July 2, 1942, ch. 477, 56 Stat. 611
(repealed 1945) (field exercise damage); Act. of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 16, 42 Stat. 1066
(repealed 1946) (ship collision); Act of Mar. 4, 1921, ch. 163, 41 Stat. 1436 (repealed
1945) (property damage and loss); Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 252, § 4, 41 Stat. 1015
(repealed 1943) (damage by Corps of Engineers); Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, art.
105, 41 Stat. 759, 808 (repealed 1956) (claims for thefts).
102. Act of July 3, 1943, ch. 189, 57 Stat. 372 (repealed 1946) (current version
at 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1970)).
103. Id. 57 Stat. 372, § 1.
104. Id. § 5a.
105. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 597, 59 Stat. 662 (1945) (repealed 1956) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1970)).
106. Military Claims Act, ch. 163, 70A Stat. 152 (1956) (current version at 10
U.S.C. § 2733 (1970)).
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but "every precaution against disturbing existing rights, privileges,
duties, or functions" was taken.10 7
The Military Claims Act has the following characteristics. First,
the remedy is exclusively administrative, 0 8 and judicial review is not
available.'0 9 Judicial notice of this was taken in Lundeen v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries,"0 in which the court said, "No recourse
to the courts is given under this act, and there must be an agreed
settlement . . ... " Second, the settlement procedures are deter-
mined by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary's designees ' 2
in each military department. The rules are recorded in the Code of
Federal Regulations'" and the regulations of each service." 4  Third,
each service settles claims charged to itself, with the exception that in
each foreign country one arm of the military is assigned total respon-
sibility for settlement of all claims against the armed forces in that
country." 5 As the settling agent it determines the merit of the case
filed against it and acts as the only agency through which the claimant
may seek redress.
Fourth, no appeal is available except to the agency that originally
reduced or denied the claim."16 This particular aspect of the law was
the subject of much discussion during the hearing before the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs prior to the passage of the first version
of the Act. The War Department advocated the provisions to save
Congress work by removing the small claims from its consideration
and to save the government money." 7 Whether the saving of money
was to come from less paperwork or from smaller payments to claimants
was not made clear. Senator Chandler questioned this portion of the
bill, asking whether it transferred from Congress the right to decide
whether a claim was just. In response, Colonel Clark, testifying for
the War Department, said:
107. S. REP. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1956).
108. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (1970).
109. 10 U.S.C. § 2735 (1970).
110. 78 Wash. 2d 66, 469 P.2d 886 (1970).
111. Id. at 70, 469 P.2d at 889.
112. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (1970).
113. 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.1-.29 (1976) (Army); 32 C.F.R. §§ 750.501-.57 (1976)
(Navy); 32 C.F.R. §§ 842.1-.48 (1976) (Air Force).
114. U.S. DEP'T OF AmMY, REG. No. 27-20, para. 3.1-3.17 (1970 & Supp. 1977);
U.S. DEP'T OF Am FoRcE MANUAL BEG. No. 112-1, ff 7 (Oct. 14, 1977); U.S. DEP'T
OF NAVY, M'uAL OF Tim JuDGE ADVOCATE GENmiAL, §§ 2050-68 (1970).
115. See note 189 & accompanying text infra.
116. 10 U.S.C. § 2735 (1970).
117. Hearings on S. 1026 Before the Comm. on Military Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1943).
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We evaluate these claims just as carefully from their legal side
as we would if we were sitting as a judge or jury . . . . They are
evaluated by lawyers, men of experience, men who are selected
for that job . . . . [T]hey are impartial, and we believe we pro-
tect fully the interest of the individual and the interest of the
Government.118
Senator Chandler was not satisfied and expressed his concern that
appeal to the same agency that previously denied the claim was no real
review. The Senator was assured that a claimant who was not satisfied
with the remedy offered by the military could still seek a private relief
bill.119 After the topic was discussed on the floor of the House, the
members of Congress were again reassured by the congressional sup-
porters of the legislation that a private bill would be available,120 and
the Military Claims Act passed the 78th Congress. In fact, Congress
through the years has removed itself even further from the process of
military claims, and the possibility of passage of a private relief bill
after reduction or denial of a claim by the service involved is remote.
121
Fifth, the statutory amount that may be paid by the military is
$25,000.122 Sixth, the settling authority may decide whether claims
above its jurisdictional amount are meritorious. It is further author-
ized to make a partial payment to the claimant and submit a request
for the remainder of the amount to Congress for consideration if the
claimant will agree to the final settlement.1 23  By this technique, the
military becomes a judge of all claims filed against it under the Act
and is able to obtain settlements beyond the statutory limit of its own
funding.
Seventh, the statute of limitations is two years. 24  Eighth, a claim
for damages must be presented for medical, hospital, and burial ex-
penses, for loss or diminution of income, for physical disfigurement,
and for pain and suffering.12' Ninth, any settlement is final.12 6
Because the overseas dependent is denied relief under the Federal
Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Claims Act,
with these enumerated and limiting characteristics, provides the only
option for recovery from the government for the injury to an American
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6-10.
120. 89 CONc. REC. 6748-49 (1943).
121. See generally S. REP. No. 2216, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958); H.R. RE,.
No. 93-539, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
122. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (Supp. V 1975).
123. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2733(d), (e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
124. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(1) (1970).
125. 32 C.F.R. § 536.8 (1976) (Army); 32 C.F.R. § 750.56 (1976) (Navy); U.S.
DEP'T OF Am FoRcE MANuA. REG. No. 112-1, f[ 1-la(2) (Oct. 14, 1977).
126. 10 U.S.C. § 2735 (Supp. V 1975).
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military dependent by an American doctor in an American hospital
abroad.
Recovery from the Individual Tortfeasor
The stateside military dependent injured by a military doctor has
a basis for recovery from the government in the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The dependent injured overseas has a basis for limited relief
from the government in the Military Claims Act. The question is what
relief may be available by bringing suit against the individual doctor
or doctors involved.
Prior to October 1976, the military doctors and other health care
providers were subject to civil suit for medical malpractice, as were
their civilian counterparts. 127 By the passage of public law 94-464,
the so-called military malpractice bill, however, Congress has at-
tempted to resolve the problem of medical malpractice in the military.
The new law is important both for its legal impact and for the expres-
sion of congressional intent inherent in it.
The core provision of the military malpractice bill is that in cases
cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Act is the exclusive
remedy. 128  Suits against individual tortfeasors are foreclosed. The
bill applies to any physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, paramedical,
or other supporting personnel who by negligent or wrongful act or
omission causes personal injury or death while acting within the scope
of duties as a member of the armed forces or the Department of De-
fense. If suit is brought against the individual, the case is transferred
to a United States district court, and it automatically becomes a case
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which will be defended by the
Attorney General. 2 9  Further, the Attorney General is empowered
to settle and compromise the suit as in other Federal Tort Claims Act
cases. 30
If the medical personnel are stationed abroad or are on loan to
a nonfederal agency or institution, however, suit against them would
not be cognizible under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the protec-
tive provisions would not apply. The new law provides some other
measures of protection for such personnel because they are subject to
private suit. Under the law, if the matter is not acceptable for action
under Title 28,131 the head of the agency or a designee may provide
127. See Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
128. Act. of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (to be codified in
10 U.S.C. § 1089(a)).
129. Id. (c).
130. Id. (d).
131. The district court determines whether a case is actionable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id. (c).
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liability insurance or "hold harmless" the individuals whose conduct
has been called in question.132  The Attorney General will defend any
person within the intended coverage of the Act in civil actions in any
court.' a
For the stateside dependent the method of recovery is clear. The
only remedy for military medical malpractice is the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and no suit is allowed against the individual tortfeasor.
For the overseas dependent the issue is unclear. When faced with a
claim that does not fall within the purview of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the new law provides a purely discretionary function for the head
of each department to hold harmless the individual tortfeasor or to pro-
vide insurance.13 4  The extent to which these tools will be used by the
military is uncertain, and their application may vary with the philo-
sophical viewpoint of the person holding the secretarial post at any
given point in time. Under the provisions of the law, therefore, the
Secretary of Defense exercises sole discretion in determining whether
the government will pay a judgment against an individual doctor that
results from malpractice committed abroad. Thus, no standard on-
going policy exists on which both doctors and patients can rely. The
new military malpractice bill fails to define the full scope of the hold
harmless doctrine so clarification of the full rights of the parties must
await judicial decisions.
In order to anticipate the possible future extent of use by the
military of the discretionary features of the law, a brief consideration
of the background which led to its enactment may be enlightening.
Congressional impetus for the military malpractice bill came from the
military establishment as a result of Henderson v. Bluemink,' 35 decided
in 1974. In that case Fifyne Henderson, a military dependent, filed
suit against Major G. Bluemink alleging that he "improperly treated,
diagnosed, and prescribed" for her and that he otherwise committed
several acts of medical malpractice. Major Bluemink was granted a
summary judgment in the district court on the ground that absolute
immunity accompanied his performance of official military duties.
The court of appeals remanded the case after finding that Major
Bluemink's medical decisions were not clothed in official governmental
immunity. In analyzing the functions of the immunity defense, the
court stated that the "immunity conferred [is] not . . . the same for
132. Id. (f).
133. Id. (b).
134. "The head of the agency concerned or his designee may, to the extent that
he or his designee deems appropriate, hold harmless or provide liability insurance ......
Id. (f).
135. 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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all officials for all purposes,"13 and it found that the primary purpose
of the defense was to protect the discretionary function of those de-
termining governmental policy. The court rejected the government's
argument that vigorous administration of governmental policies would
be hampered by holding military medical personnel liable for their
negligence in the exercise of medical functions. The court expressly
noted the fact that Congress had made the Federal Tort Claims Act
the exclusive remedy in cases involving Veterans' Administration medi-
cal personnel but had not included military medical personnel in the
law. It said, "The extension of similar protection to the class of which
appellee is a member is properly within the realm of the legislative
branch of the United States. We refrain from affording absolute
immunity by judicial decision."1 7
Following Henderson, a number of suits was filed against indi-
vidual military doctors. The military services became alarmed at the
resulting decline of morale in the medical corps and the consequent
resignations of medical personnel from the services. Malpractice in-
surance policies were too expensive for the military doctor to afford
on a limited salary, and many insurance companies refused to write
policies for military doctors at any price.138 To "go bare" and practice
without insurance coverage could mean financial ruin. For self-pro-
tection, doctors were leaving the military and entering the civilian
medical field in which insurance costs could be passed on to the patient.
During the legislative hearings on the malpractice bill, testimony
was given which focused attention on an aspect of medical practice
unique to the military. Generally the civilian doctor may consider
the potential legal risk of any procedure, and if the risk is perceived
as being too high, the doctor will refuse to undertake the activity.
The option of refusal is not often available to the military doctor. The
service physician is assigned duties which, under military law, must
be completed. 89 Thus some members of the medical corps were re-
luctant to remain in situations in which they were working outside
their field of specialization such as when assigned to emergency room
duty140 or when assuming responsibility for the personnel participat-
ing in hospital training programs.14  The Washington policyinakers
realized some form of protection had to be developed if the services
were to maintain the medical corps as a viable unit. The Federal Tort
Claims Act had already been extended to cover Veterans' Adminis-
136. Id. at 401 (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319 (1973)).
137. 511 F.2d at 404.
138. Malpractice Hearings, supra note 83, at 23, 25, 34.
139. Id. at 24.
140. Id. at 23.
141. Id. at 36.
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tration personnel; 142 Congress merely extended its coverage to the
military.
143
The military malpractice bill was designed to protect the doctor
in an individual capacity and the armed forces, not the patient. The
history of the enactment seems to indicate a congressional intent that
the doctor be protected from individual suits by the broad application
of the provisions of the law. Whether the protection of the doctor
will result from insurance purchased by the Department of Defense
to protect the military doctor on overseas duty or whether the doctor
overseas will be held harmless remains unanswered. The Federal Tort
Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for dependents within the
United States injured by military medical malpractice. Whether in-
dividual suits against the military doctor will augment the limited
recovery possible under the Military Claims Act for overseas de-
pendents is unclear.
Foreign Recovery
An additional means of tort recovery for the overseas military de-
pendent is theoretically available. A United States military dependent
could seek recovery in the court of the nation where the injuries oc-
curred. A cursory examination of a few of the problems encountered
by the overseas dependent in attempting to use the foreign courts
illustrates the shortcomings of this solution for an injured American.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity for acts that are exer-
cises of public power,144 the court of a foreign state is unlikely to hold
the United States accountable for torts committed by military per-
sonnel while acting pursuant to their official government orders. 145
The court would extend the doctrine to the individual doctor if the
tort was committed while the doctor was acting on military orders1
46
and if the exercise of medical discretion was not adjudged a private
act. This position is reflected in a number of treaties between the
United States and countries where United States troops are located.
47
142. See note 56 supra.
143. See note 128 supra.
144. Acts of a state that are sovereign in nature and are exercises of public power
are designated as jure imperii and can be contrasted with those which are jure gestionis
in which the state acts in a manner comparable to private activity. N. LEECH, C.
OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 322 (1973).
145. Schwenk, Immunity of the United States From Suits Abroad, 45 MIL. L. REV.
23, 40 (1969).
146. Id. at 39.
147. E.g., Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, pt. IV, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 4278, 4304-05, T.I.A.S.
No. 3425; Agreement regarding Status of United Nations Forces in Japan, Feb. 19,
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These treaties provide for the limited exercise of jurisdiction by the
receiving state over the armed forces of the sending state.
In the unlikely event that sovereign immunity or treaty provisions
did not insulate the doctor, the difficulty in securing jurisdiction over
a transient military person could preclude suit in a foreign court.
Legally recognized bases for obtaining jurisdiction over the person
differ from nation to nation, especially over a defendant who is a non-
citizen. Many nations require personal service on the defendant.
148
Military tours abroad are usually relatively short. The period in which
the presence of the involved parties overlap may be brief, perhaps
only a few months. Often by the time the full extent of the injuries
is known, one or both parties will have left the country of the situs of
the tort and relocated. By its very nature, court action Is a protracted
process which is not designed with the particular problems of mobile
military personnel in mind. Thus, whether the injured dependent
would remain in the country long enough to institute suit or whether
the defendant would remain long enough for the foreign court to
acquire jurisdiction through service of process is questionable.
Even if the threshold requirement of jurisdiction were met, the
applicable law and recovery procedures vary substantially from nation
to nation. Once a judgment is secured, the problem of enforcement
remains. If the doctor has completed the tour of duty abroad, the
plaintiff must seek enforcement of the judgment, perhaps in the United
States. 149  Further, costly legal action will be entailed. The possi-
bility remains that a United States court may refuse to recognize the
foreign civil judgment and thus leave the plaintiff without recourse. 50
The variation of jurisdiction, recovery rights, and legal procedures
among the nations in which United States forces serve prevent the use
of the foreign courts as a viable solution for the overseas military
dependent.
In sum, within this framework of laws the military dependent
must seek damages for injuries inflicted by the negligence of military
doctors. For the stateside dependent the Federal Tort Claims Act
offers the means for a judicial determination on the merits of the case.
For the overseas dependent the best opportunity for a recovery cur-
rently involves recourse under the Military Claims Act.
1954, pt. II, [1956] 5 U.S.T. 1123, 1138-40, T.I.A.S. No. 2995, 214 U.N.T.S. 148,
174-180; Agreement between Parties to North Atlantic Treaty regarding Status of
Forces, June 19, 1951, pt. II, [1951] 4 U.S.T. 1792, 1802-09, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199
U.N.T.S. 67, 82-88.
148. See Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, Barr. Y.B. IN'L. 145, 170-
77 (1972-73).
149. See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey
and A Suggested Approach, 81 H.ARv. L. REv . 1601 (1968).
150. Id.
January 1978] MILITARY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The Military Claims Act: An Inadequate Remedy
The United States military complex maintains a worldwide chain
of fighting units and operational bases pursuant to the perceived needs
of a national defense posture. Accompanying combat personnel are
the necessary support personnel and facilities to ensure their well-
being. This support includes a fully functioning medical arm for
each service,' 5 ' designed to keep personnel in good physical condition
for adequate completion of the defined job duties. Although in war
this care entails the treatment of war-related injuries, in peacetime
the military population is subject to the same physical health prob-
lems as the general population.' 52 The range of medical services re-
quired and ultimately provided, therefore, equals that of the civilian
community.
Because many members of the military support a family and other
economic dependents, care of these nonmilitary dependents must be
considered in the total health care picture, and because some military
personnel serve twenty or more years, long range health needs must
be met. Care to dependents is provided as part of Title 10 of the
United States Code,1 53 which authorizes such treatment for the de-
pendent of any member of the uniformed services who is on active
duty for more than thirty days or who has died during such active
duty. 5 1 Eligibility is subject to space availability and the capabili-
ties of the medical and dental staff.' 55 Care may be provided by any
branch of the military, not just that of the sponsor. 56 The range of
authorized care is quite complete. It includes hospitalization, out-
patient care, drugs, physical examinations, immunizations, maternity
and infant care, diagnostic procedures, and treatment of medical,
surgical, nervous, mental, chronic, and contagious conditions. 5 7
Health care is provided through hospitals and outpatient clinics at-
tached to various posts or bases stateside and abroad. Large hospitals,
complete with internship programs and advanced specialty training,
are usually located close to the concentrations of military population.
In 1971 more than fifteen thousand doctors and their support
personnel, about five percent of the nation's medical force, were in-
volved with providing health care to the military. This care involved
151. See note 5 supra.
152. DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. 292 (FY 1978) (report by Secretary of De-
fense D. Rumsfeld).
153. 10 U.S.C. § 1076-78 (1970).
154. 10 U.S.C. § 1076(a) (1970).
155. Id. (a), (c).
156. Id. (d).
157. 10 U.S.C. § 1077(a) (1970).
[Vol. 29THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
over one million hospital admissions and over fifty-seven million out-
patient clinic visits during the year.158
Many members of the services are stationed abroad. For ex-
ample, in 1976 four hundred and fifty-five thousand American service
personnel were overseas. 159 Dependents often accompany their spon-
sor and thereby create large numbers of Americans under the military
health care system. These dependents receive the same categories of
treatment as stateside dependents and in addition receive routine
dental work, prosthetic devices, and orthopedic footware if not avail-
able on the local foreign market.'0 °
Because the scope of care in military hospitals and dispensaries
equals that of a large community or university hospital, so too does
the statistical probability of error on the part of the practicing physi-
cian.'" Consequently, the military, like the civilian health field, has
experienced a significant increase in the filing of medical malpractice
actions. For example, in 1964 only three claims were made against
the Air Force for medical malpractice, and only $12.25 was paid in
damages. In contrast, in 1974, ninety-one claims were made and over
$130 thousand was paid. In the first five months of 1975 there were
over one hundred claims with a total ad damnum of more than $60
million.1
6 2
This increase has resulted from a number of factors. First, one
characteristic of modem medicine - its technical sophistication - has
contributed substantially to this increase. Sophisticated equipment
and procedures make more drastic treatment measures possible, but
resulting injuries may also be more severe. 63 Persons sustaining se-
vere injuries bear burdensome physical and monetary costs and have
158. Welch & Shear, supra note 7, at 27.
159. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 334 (97th ed. 1976). The
number of service personnel abroad is subject to substantial variation in response to
the defense posture of the United States. In 1972, for example, 635 thousand Amer-
ican service personnel were abroad; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SELECTED MANPowER STATIS-
TiCS 37 (1973).
160. 10 U.S.C. § 1077(b) (1970).
161. "[M]odem high-quality medicine carries risks that unavoidably result in some
injuries to patients, no matter how much care, skill and judgment is applied." HEW,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S CO1I:[SSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 24 (1973). "The
media causes patients to have greater expectations about the propensity for miracles
by modem medicine. . ... CALIF. ASSFmLY SELECT CoMIanE ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT 4 (1974).
162. Malpractice Hearings, supra note 83, at 33. The Air Force Claims Admin-
istration listed 26 claims for medical malpractice between 1963 and 1968 and total
damages paid of $92.25. From 1969 to 1974, 374 claims were made, and $1,086,943
was paid in settlement. Id. at 22.
163. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
1-2 (1973).
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more incentive to seek money damages. Second, consumers generally
are becoming more aware of their rights. Civilian and military persons
are less hesitant to state a claim, even one that involves taking a stand
against the established medical profession.164 Third, military medi-
cine is basically impersonal. Care is given at large clinics with rotat-
ing staff members. A patient may not see the same doctor twice. A
feeling of alienation and frustration between doctor and patient may
result so that, if an injury occurs, blaming the treating physician is
psychologically easier. 165
The increase in the military claims statistics is especially striking,
however, because it has occurred notwithstanding a countervailing in-
fluence. The military, the agency from whom the dependent seeks
recovery, employs not only the doctor but also the sponsor of the
dependent. Some members of the military believe that success within
the armed forces is related to the unquestioning acceptance of decisions
made within the system itself. Thus, they may fear that asserting
their rights in an overt and public manner ultimately may limit career
potential and promotional opportunities. Before such persons decide
to seek legal redress, they weigh the perceived potential career conse-
quences against the severity of the injury and the financial burden.
Thus, they could be expected to undertake legal action less frequently
than those whose employer has no financial interest in the outcome
of the claim.
Nonetheless, the statistics indicate a growing number of claims
arising from medical malpractice in the military and the problem of
recovery for the overseas dependent can be expected to assume greater
importance. Consequently, an assessment of the Military Claims Act,
the exclusive remedy for the overseas dependent under American law,
is needed. It will be seen that the recovery provisions of the Military
Claims Act as passed by Congress thirty-four years ago and as cur-
rently implemented by the Department of Defense fail to provide
adequate relief for the overseas military dependent.
Filing the Claim
Typically, the initial contact with the legal system for the overseas
dependent who is a potential claimant is a military lawyer stationed
at an American base in the foreign country. Here the injured de-
pendent is introduced to the provisions of the Military Claims Act and
informed that no legal cause of action against the federal government
164. Id. at 25; see CALIF. ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMrrTEE ON MEDICA , MALPRACTICE,
PRELIMINARY REPORT 4 (1974).
165. CALI. ASSEMBLY SELECT CoMMrrrEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PREIMA-
NARY REPORT 3 (1974).
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exists. All damages must be processed as claims against the military
under an administrative procedure.
The most practical problem faced by the claimant is the lack of
legal assistance. Any cost or inconvenience incurred while filing a
claim is not recoverable in damages,166 as would occur under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.16 7  Therefore, the claimant must absorb the
cost of counsel or forego independent counsel and rely upon the aid
of the base military lawyer, who represents the government. The
limits within which this military attorney can function are severely
restricted by law and military regulations. The staff attorney may
provide the forms for filing a claim, explain the general requirements
for a claim, suggest what supporting documentation might be neces-
sary, and tell the claimant where properly to file the form. 68 The
military attorney is prohibited, however, from commenting on the
merits of the claim or from discussing the settlement policy of the
armed forces.169 At all times, the armed forces counsel must take care
to operate within the federal law, which makes it a crime for any
officer of the government to act as an agent or attorney in the prose-
cution of any claim against the United States. 70 If the claimant is
unwilling or unable to pay for further legal assistance, the result is
that the United States is represented by active, qualified counsel, but
the claimant is not. The claimant, nonetheless, must properly file the
claim with the correct authorities and provide all the necessary sub-
stantiating evidence.' 7 ' These procedures may prove to be unduly
complex if attempted without benefit of counsel.
A further problem is the statute of limitations. The Military
Claims Act has a two-year statute of limitations, 7 2 which is worded
similarly to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 7 3  The two-year period for
the Federal Tort Claims Act has been judicially interpreted to run
from the time when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the
injury.'7 4  Determining this point in time is a question of fact which
under the Federal Tort Claims Act is impartially determined by the
166. U.S. DEP'T OF AmiY, REG. No. 27-20, para. 2-18 (Jan. 1, 1971); U.S. DEP'T
oF NAvy, MANuAL OF THE JuDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, § 2056(c) (1970).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970).
168. 32 C.F.R. § 750.10(c) (1976) (Navy); 32 CF.R. § 536.2(b) (1976) (Army);
32 C.F.R. § 842.6(b) (1976) (Air Force).
169. 32 C.F.R. § 536.2(a) (1976) (Army); 32 C.F.R. § 750.10(c) (1976) (Navy);
32 C.F.R. §§ 842.6(a), 842.7 (1976) (Air Force).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
171. 32 C.F.R. § 536.6(d) (1976) (Army); 32 C.F.R. § 842.2-.3 (1976) (Air
Force); 32 C.F.R. § 750.12-.13 (1976) (Navy).
172. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(1) (1970).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970).
174. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
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trier of fact and may be reviewable on appeal.', 5  Under the Military
Claims Act, however, the determination is made by the agency against
whom the claim is made. Because both laws share the common two-
year statute of limitations and both are concerned with claims against
the government, the same standard for determining the running of
the statute would probably be used,176 but the regulations do not state
the standard to be applied. If a decision goes against the claimant,
appeal to a third party or impartial mediator is not provided.
The Investigation
When a surgical accident or medical treatment error occurs, the
service involved must investigate the incident if it appears that a claim
against the government has resulted or may result.177 The federal
regulations specify that the investigation is to be prompt and thorough
and is to be conducted "in a fair and impartial manner . . . to the
end that a comprehensive, accurate, and unbiased factual report of the
incident may be made . *..."178 The fact remains that the service
against whom the claim is being made investigates its own actions.
Utilizing the evidence gathered, service personnel decide whether to
pay the claimant and, if so, in what amount. Although the regula-
tions require an unbiased investigation, a staff member questioning the
alleged tortfeasor may not exhibit the same vigor and intensiveness as
would representatives of the claimant. Medical malpractice intrin-
sically has aspects that make investigation especially complex and
elusive.179  In the military situation these may include a desire on
the doctor's part to protect opportunities for promotion as well as over-
all medical reputation. Given the existence of such reasons to couch
175. Hanna v. United States Veterans' Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1975);
Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973); Tyminski v. United States, 481
F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); Hunger-
ford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
176. During congressional consideration of Pub. L. No. 446, 70 Stat. 60 (1956),
which changed the original one-year statute of limitations of the Military Claims Act
to two years, the expressed intention was that there be uniformity among the claims
statutes. H.R. REP. No. 288, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
177. 32 C.F.R. § 536.1-.11(b) (1976) (Army); 32 C.F.R. § 750.3 (1976) (Navy).
178. 32 C.F.R. § 750.6(b) (1976).
179. It has been argued that as the result of the fact that medical error may be ex-
tremely serious, the medical profession has developed means of rationalizing and ex-
plaining mistakes to ease the sense of guilt often felt by medical personnel. It is an
institutionalized neutralization of error through such tools as considering failure as a
normal part of the "art of medicine," portrayal of the patient as difficult and unco-
operative, the minimizing of the actual effect of the error, and explaining the doctor's
conduct as reasonable in a medically poor situation. MnLLMAN, THE UNKINDEsTr CuT
91, 107, 109, 117 (1976).
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information in a self-serving light, the adversary process could clearly
expand the information available to the fact finder. Yet, under the
Military Claims Act there is no access to the wide range of discovery
procedures nor the option for cross-examination as there is under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. In the administrative procedure total re-
liance is placed on the service evaluation of the event. The service,
however, is not bound by the findings of the investigation and is free
to consider any facts it deems relevant in making a determination.
As part of the investigation process, the claimant may be required
by the military to undergo a physical examination to assess the nature
and extent of the injuries received. Under federal regulations this
examination is to be conducted at a military hospital. 180 If the claim-
ant refuses to have the examination performed by military doctors,
the entire claim for damages may be denied. Outside specialists are
consulted only in specifically authorized situations.' 8 ' In effect, one
military doctor evaluates the damage allegedly caused by another
military doctor. The potential for a less than unbiased judgment is
again present. The claimant may secure an independent evaluation
by civilian specialists, but to what extent the settling service would
rely on an outside source is unknown, especially if the claimant's
experts should disagree with the service's own medical staff.
Recovery
Recovery under the Military Claims Act is a matter of grace, not
of legal right., x82 Any amount paid by the service is the result of its
attempting to implement congressional policy that the government is
responsible for damages its agents and servants cause. A threshold
requirement for recovery, established by the statute, is that the damage
be caused by a government employee while acting within the scope
of employment.
The specific rules for recognizing claims are promulgated inde-
pendently by each service, and differing standards have been adopted
by each branch of the armed forces. The Air Force regulation en-
compasses and recognizes only those "tort-type claims not cognizable
under other statutes, that involve property damage, personal injury,
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of mili-
tary personnel . . . acting in the, scope of their employment."183 In
contrast the Navy regulation includes all damages caused by military
personnel or civilian employees of the Navy while acting within the
180. 32 C.F.R. § 750.6(g)(1) (1976).
181. Id. (g)(4).
182. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 842.41(b) (1976).
183. U.S. DEP'T OF Am FoRcE MAmuAL REG. No. 112-1, ff 7-2(d) (Oct. 14, 1977).
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scope of their employment'18 4 and excludes from payment only those
damages proximately caused in whole or in part by the contributory
negligence or wrongful act of the claimant.18s The Navy apparently
requires only a direct causal connection between the harm and the
act in order to award damages. On the other hand, the Army requires
that the act or omission of the employee be "negligent, wrongful or
otherwise involving fault."1s 6
The difference in philosophy and approach among the services
toward the settlement of claims is reflected in a comparison of the
dispositions of actual cases. In one study the Air Force "disallowed
an overwhelming majority of their administrative claims, while the
Army allowed payment in some 59 percent of its claims."' 187 Each
service applies standard American law in reaching its determinations,
but the results vary.188 Payment does not depend totally on the merits
of the claim but, instead, on which service processes it.
For the overseas dependent, which service settles the claim de-
pends entirely on the location where the tort took place. Although
the Military Claims Act provides that a claim must be made against
the agency responsible for the damages, the Department of Defense
has, for administrative purposes, divided the jurisdictional areas abroad.
Specific branches of the military have been assigned the task of proc-
essing all claims against the United States that are payable under
certain statutory sections, including the Military Claims Act.18 9 For
example, a claim made in Korea or Germany would be settled by the
Army, one in Italy or Australia would be processed by the Navy, and
a claim arising in Spain or the United Kingdom would go to the Air
Force. As a result of this policy, even an Army dependent injured
in an Army hospital would not benefit from the more liberal Army
settlement provisions if the incident took place other than in the Army's
settlement jurisdiction.
Once the service designated to take the claim has been determined,
the actual settlement is made by military claims lawyers on various
command levels. They have the authority to pay in full, award a
partial amount, or deny in full. The command level at which the
claim is processed depends on the monetary amount sought. Claims
for $2,500 or less are usually handled at the nearest local command
184. U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, § 2052(a)
(1970).
185. Id. at § 2055(d)(1).
186. U.S. DEP'T OF Armty, REG. No. 27-20, para. 3-4(a) (Nov. 25, 1974).
187. Welch & Shear, supra note 7, at 34.
188. Navy Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
189. 32 C.F.R. § 750.24 (1976) (incorporating DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No.
5518.5 series (NOTAL)).
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level where a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps is sta-
tioned. The next level of claims go to major commands or to the
service headquarters, and claims of $25,000 or more go to the Chief
of the Claims Service or to the Judge Advocate General of the desig-
nated branch of the armed forces.190 For those claims above the
statutory limit, the secretary of the department will determine whether
the case is meritorious. If found to be meritorious, the Secretary is
authorized to settle for an amount above the $25,000, to order the
service to pay the claimant the $25,000, and to submit any remaining
amount to be paid to Congress as part of the department's appropria-
tion request. Of course, the Secretary may deny a claim in full.19'
Appeal
The regulations provide that if a claim is denied in whole or in
part, the injured overseas dependent may within thirty days request
reconsideration by the settling authority on the basis of fraud, collu-
sion, new material evidence, or manifest error of fact. The request
must be accompanied by a complete statement giving the reasons for
reconsideration.1
92
In addition, the claimant may also appeal any denial or reduction
of a claim if the appeal is made within thirty days of the date of the
denial. Appeals are limited, however, to the branch of the service
that made the original denial. Navy appeals are sent to; the Secretary
of the Navy or the Judge Advocate General, 93 and Air Force appeals
go to the Secretary of the Air Force.194 In the Army, appeals are
processed by the Secretary of the Army if the claim is in excess of
$2,500; otherwise the appeal is decided by the Judge Advocate General,
an assistant Judge Advocate General, or the Chief of the Army Claims
Service. 95 Any decision on appeal is final and binding, and no further
action is provided. At no time does the claim go beyond the military.
190. U.S. DEP'T OF Ai FORCE MUAi. REG. No. 112-1, f[ 7-10 (Oct. 14, 1977);
U.S. DEP'T OF ARmf, PEG. No. 27-20, para. 3-14 (Aug. 25, 1975); U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY
MANUwAL OF TnE JuDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL, App. A-20-e.
191. U.S. DEP'T OF Am FORCE MANuALR EG. No. 112-1, II 7-10(e) (Oct. 14, 1977);
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. No. 27-20, para. 3-15 (Aug. 25, 1975); U.S. DEP'T OF NAvY,
MANuAL OF THE JuDGE ADVocATE GENERAL, § 2052(b) (1970).
192. 32 C.F.R. § 750.20(b)(2) (1976) (Navy); 32 C.F.R. § 536.24(b) (1976)
(Army).
193. 32 C.F.R. § 750.53(h)(2)-(3) (1976). Appeals for claims under $5,000
may be decided by lower level personnel, however, providing the decision is made
by an official senior to the official who originally disapproved the claim. Id. (3).
194. U.S. DEP'T OF Am FORCE, MANUAL REG. No. 112-1, gf 7-11 (Oct. 14, 1977).
The Secretary of the Air Force has delegated the authority to consider appealed claims,
but no settling authority may take appellate action on its own settlement. Id.
195. 32 C.F.R. § 536.24a(b) (1976).
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In this situation, with no appeal within the judicial system, either
the claimant takes what the military offers, albeit below the claimed
amount and below damages that might have been awarded in a court
settlement, or the claimant takes nothing. In the five years preceding
1971, the mean value of settled claims against the federal establishment
was less than half the value of plaintiff judgments awarded against the
government by the courts. 196 An overseas dependent may thus re-
cover substantially less than a stateside dependent for equal physical
injury resulting from medical malpractice.
The administrative remedy provided by the Military Claims Act
is insufficient to give adequate protection to dependents injured over-
seas by military medical personnel. First, recovery for the cost of
independent legal counsel is denied the claimant, although it would
be recoverable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Second, there is
no provision for an independent investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the event alleged to have caused the harm nor of the
extent of the physical damage to the claimant. Third, the "in house"
determination and discretionary nature of the award provides a po-
tential for denial of a just claim. Finally, the lack of meaningful
appeal discourages refusal of inadequate settlement offers.
Conclusion
When military personnel are ordered overseas, they go in response
to the perceived needs of the nation. Yet, the very act of going over-
seas accompanied by family denies military personnel the right to a
judicial remedy if one of the dependent family members is injured by
military medical personnel. Additionally, most members of the armed
forces are unaware of the recovery limitations until after a tort takes
place and damages are sought. The sacrifice by the family unit of
serving the nation may become costly indeed.
Throughout the entire claims process the disparity between the
rights of the stateside dependent and the rights of the overseas de-
pendent are great. For the dependent injured in the United States,
administrative settlement under the Federal Tort Claims Act is un-
limited in authorized amount, legal fees are recoverable, a legal cause
of action is created, discovery is available, a judicial trial on the merits
is possible, and judicial decisions are reviewable by the federal ap-
pellate system. For the dependent injured overseas, administrative
settlement under the Military Claims Act is limited in amount unless
Congress specifically grants a larger award, no legal fees are provided,
no legal cause of action exists, no discovery is available, no trial is
possible, and no judicial review or appeal exists.
196. Welch & Shear, supra note 7, at 30.
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It is unlikely that Congress intended this result. Rather, the
situation appears to have evolved as an anomaly in the law. Congress
designed the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide a judicial remedy for
victims of government torts in the United States. The Foreign Claims
Act, with its liberal award policy, was intended to provide damages
for torts committed abroad. The military dependent who is injured
in a foreign country, however, is caught between these two laws, and
the Military Claims Act, intended to cover military torts not gener-
ally associated with civilian counterparts, has been expanded to meet
the ever rising number of medical malpractice claims from overseas
military dependents.
It is time for Congress thoughtfully and directly to consider the
issue. The problem can be solved by expanding the Federal Tort
Claims Act to include those torts committed on a United States military
base abroad by a member or civilian employee of the United States
military within the scope of employment against a legal dependent of
a member of the United States armed forces. Jurisdiction can be
authorized within the federal court system, and either general Ameri-
can tort law or the tort law of a specific location, such as the District
of Columbia, can be designated as the applicable law for the cases
cognizable under the legislation.
The recovery rights of the overseas military dependent victim of
medical malpractice should be made equal to those of the stateside
counterpart. The present dual system makes the award of damages
for malpractice committed abroad too uncertain and biased. Such
a practice should not be allowed to continue unchallenged and
uncorrected.
Jane Louise Stratton*
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